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INTRODUCTION
The awarding of attorney's fees in civil rights cases is a central component
of a well-ordered civil rights regime. The Senate Report on the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 claimed that numerous pieces of civil
rights legislation "depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards
have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful
opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws
contain."' Noting that "[i]n many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the
citizen who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to
hire a lawyer,"2 those citizens and their lawyers, acting as private attorneys
general,3 "must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate
these rights in court."'4 The award of attorney's fees is particularly important for
those plaintiffs who win only nominal damagesS-5a frequent occurrence in
civil rights lawsuits-and therefore cannot pay attorneys out of their
compensatory or punitive damage awards.
Along these same lines, the curtailment of opportunities to recover
attorney's fees in civil rights cases has been a central feature of the recent
retrenchment of "the capacity of progressive public-interest lawyers to bring
f Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2006. University of Cambridge, Faculty of Education, M.Phil.
2003. Yale College, B.A. 2002. The author wishes to thank Dan Korobkin for helpful comments and
editing.
1. S. REP. No. 1011,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1976, at 2, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910.
2. Id
3. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam) ("When a
plaintiff brings an action under [Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964], he cannot recover damages. If
he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself but also as a "private attorney general," vindicating a
policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.").
4. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1976, at 2, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910.
5. See CHARLES T. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 20, at 85 (1935)
("Nominal damages are damages awarded for the infraction of a legal right, where the extent of the loss
is not shown, or where the right is one not dependent upon loss or damage, as in the case of rights of
bodily immunity or rights to have one's material property undisturbed by direct invasion. The award of
nominal damages is made as a judicial declaration that the plaintiff's right has been violated.").
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cases." 6 The Supreme Court's definitive statement on this issue came in Farrar
v. Hobby,7 in which the Court adopted a strict standard for assessing attorney's
fees in civil rights cases, holding that plaintiffs winning only nominal damages
are not entitled to attorney's fees. Justice O'Connor carved out a narrow
exception to this rule in her concurrence, arguing that lawyers winning only
nominal fees for their clients while still serving a significant public purpose by
litigating the case were entitled to attorney's fees.
In the wake of Farrar, state courts interpreting the surfeit of state and local
civil rights provisions have been confronted with two significant jurisprudential
problems. First, ought they to adopt the Farrar standard? Because the majority
of state and local civil rights laws are based on analogous federal statutes,
canons of statutory construction would counsel reliance on Supreme Court
doctrine in interpreting all the statutes similarly. But many state and local
ordinances are meant to reach farther than federal statutes and the Supreme
Court's narrow interpretation of them, so reliance on Farrar might be
counterproductive to the local laws' aims. Second, if states do adopt the Farrar
standard for a given state or local civil rights law, how should they think about
the significant purpose exception? That is, in what circumstances-narrow or
otherwise-should they consider a given lawsuit to have served a significant
public purpose in spite of its having only nominally prevailed?
This Comment addresses one such case. In McGrath v. Toys "R" Us, the
New York Court of Appeals adopted the Farrar standard for the award of
attorney's fees in cases brought under the New York City Human Rights Law
(NYCHRL). But in applying the conservative Farrar standard to the Law, the
court also adopted an extraordinarily broad definition of significant public
purpose, awarding attorney's fees to three preoperative transsexuals who were
harassed while shopping in a Brooklyn Toys "R" Us store. The question at the
core of this Comment is why the court would adopt such a conservative
standard for setting attorney's fees but then carve out such a broad public
purpose exception.
6. David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers,91 CAL. L. REV. 209, 209 (2003). Luban describes a panoply of laws and doctrines being deployed to
stanch the progress of public interest lawyers:
In the last few years, a disturbing pattern of legal attacks on public-interest lawyers has
emerged, targeting every one of the principal sources of support for progressive public-interest
law: the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC"), state Interest on Lawyers Trust Account("IOLTA") programs, law school clinics, and civil rights attorney's fees. The attacks seek to
win political disputes not by offering better arguments, but by defunding or otherwise
hobbling the advocates who make the arguments for the other side.
Id. at 209-10.
7. 506 U.S. 103 (1992). For commentary on Farrar, see Joseph Bean, Note, Felling the FarrarForest: Determining Whether Federal Courts Will Award § 1988 Attorney's Fees to a Prevailing Civil
Rights Plaintiff Who Only Recovers Nominal Damages, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 573 (2003); James D.Weiss, Note, Nominal Damages, Nominal Victory: Estate of Farrar v. Cain 's Improper Limit on Awards
ofAttorneys'Fees Under § 1988, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1251 (1992).
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The first Part of this Comment analyzes the legal doctrine applicable to
attorney's fees in civil rights cases where the prevailing party wins only
nominal damages, a small but significant subset of civil rights suits. It traces
the evolution of the Farrar standard in the Second Circuit and in New York.
Part II analyzes the McGrath case, in which the Farrar standard is applied to
NYCHRL notwithstanding evidence of contrary legislative intent. Ultimately, I
argue that the adoption of the Farrar standard, while formally conservative,
actually affords state courts substantially more latitude to encourage civil rights
litigation than do other interpretations of attorney's fee provisions.
I. THE FARRAR STANDARD
In Farrar v. Hobby, a jury found for the plaintiffs in a § 1983 suit,8 but
awarded them no money on their claim for seventeen million dollars. The
district court awarded them more than $300,000 in attorney's fees, however. As
the Fifth Circuit bluntly put it in reversing this fee award, "The Farrars sued for
$17 million in money damages; the jury gave them nothing. No money
damages. No declaratory relief. No injunctive relief. Nothing." 9 On appeal to
the Supreme Court, the Farrars sought to demonstrate that they were the
prevailing party within the meaning of the federal attorney's fees statute and,
therefore, were entitled to a fee award.' 0 The Supreme Court bifurcated its
reasoning in Farrar. It reaffirmed its longstanding position that civil rights
plaintiffs who recover damages in any amount, however nominal, qualify as the
"prevailing party" under the federal civil rights attorney's fee provision and
therefore, at the discretion of the court, may be allowed attorney's fees.11 In
overturning the fee award, however, the Court established a presumption
against the awarding fees to such plaintiffs, regardless of the fact that they
formally prevailed. 12 This decision significantly constrained the ability of civil
rights attorneys to collect fees.
Central to the Court's generous "prevailing party" analysis is a conception
of civil rights statutes as deterrent and behavior-modifying.' 3 As to the issue of
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (creating private right of action against any person acting under
color of state law who deprives another person of her constitutional rights).
9. Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1315 (1991), affd sub nom. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.
103 (1992).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ("In any action or proceeding to enforce [certain civil rights statutes], the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs .....
11. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 112.
12. d. at 115.
13. For example, in Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School District, the
Supreme Court's attorney's fees decision most immediately preceding Farrar, the Court held that the
plaintiffs prevailed within the meaning of the attorney's fee statute because they "materially altered the
[defendant] school district's policy limiting the rights of teachers to communicate with each other
concerning employee organizations and union activities." 489 U.S. 782, 793 (1989).
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whether the Farrars had prevailed, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority,
reasoned as follows:
[T]o qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some
relief on the merits of his claim. The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment
against the defendant from whom fees are sought, or comparable relief through a
consent decree or settlement. Whatever relief the plaintiff secures must directly
benefit him at the time of the judgment or settlement. Otherwise the judgment or
settlement cannot be said to "affec[t] the behavior of the defendant toward the
plaintiff." Only under these circumstances can civil rights litigation effect "the
material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties" and thereby transform the
plaintiff into a prevailing party. In short, a plaintiff "prevails" when actual relief on
the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by
modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.14
Only those plaintiffs vindicating important civil rights and effecting some sort
of sustainable change are regarded as victors in civil rights litigation. This is an
admittedly broad understanding of legal victory: The Court itself has noted its
"generous formulation" of the term "prevailing party."' 5
But as one hand gives, the other takes away. Without differentiating among
the extraordinarily diverse pool of plaintiffs who might be awarded only
nominal damages, Justice Thomas noted,
In some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally "prevails" under § 1988
should receive no attorney's fees at all. A plaintiff who seeks compensatory
damages but receives no more than nominal damages is often such a prevailing
party.... In a civil rights suit for damages... the awarding of nominal damages
also highlights the plaintiff's failure to prove actual, compensable injury. 16
The standard established in Farrar applies to all federal civil rights statutes
covered by the attorney's fee provision codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988.' 7 Justice
Thomas's decision would deny attorney's fees to civil rights plaintiffs
incapable of demonstrating that they had suffered some sort of compensable
injury. This reading radically truncated the class of plaintiffs entitled to
attorney's fees and, as noted in the Senate Report quoted above,18 thus
diminished the capacity of poor plaintiffs even to bring civil rights lawsuits in
the first place.
Recognizing the disadvantage wrought on civil rights plaintiffs by this
narrow reading, Justice O'Connor, in concurrence, carved out a narrow
exception to the rule. Justice O'Connor clarified Justice Thomas's decision and
14. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Rhodes v.Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per curiam), and Garland, 489 U.S. at 792-93, respectively).
15. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
16. Farrar, 596 U.S. at 115.
17. This includes "any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 198 1a, 1982,1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.], theReligious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.], the Religious Land Use andInstitutionalized Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
18. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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stressed that the Court's other attorney's fee decisions "make[] clear that an
award of nominal damages can represent a victory in the sense of vindicating
rights even though no actual damages [were] proved." 19 She then sketched out
factors other than the magnitude of the damages awarded that the district court
ought to consider in determining whether to award attorney's fees. The
"relevant indicia of success-the extent of relief, the significance of the legal
issue on which the plaintiff prevailed, and the public purpose served" 20-are all
factors to which the court ought to be attentive in awarding attorney's fees. In
carving out this exception, Justice O'Connor cast the decisive vote for a
majority and gained some ground on Justice Thomas's fulsome retreat from the
policy goal of leveling the playing field for civil rights plaintiffs.
Lower courts implementing the Farrar decision have had to engage in
largely unguided analysis of whether nominally successful plaintiffs in civil
rights suits are entitled to fee awards, their determination hemmed in only by
Justice Thomas's formal definition of "prevailing party" and Justice
O'Connor's formless recommendation that courts consider the "public
purpose" served by the suit. In the Second Circuit, plaintiffs were awarded
attorney's fees when they "prevailed on a significant legal issue-namely, that
landlords can be held liable for employing real estate brokers who are engaged
in racial steering." 21 In that case, quoting Justice O'Connor's Farrar
concurrence, the court noted that "[o]ne does not search 'in vain for the public
purpose' this litigation has served., 22 Other plaintiffs in the circuit have been
denied fees subject to Farrar reasoning where the litigation, like "[t]he vast
majority of civil rights litigation[,] does not result in ground-breaking
conclusions of law." 23 Yet there seems to be little consensus on how to
determine when new ground has actually been broken.
The implementation of the Farrar standard becomes more complex at the
state level, where state courts have been asked to rule on the applicability of
Farrar to state and local civil rights laws.24 Many state and local civil rights
laws were enacted in response to the curtailment of individual rights of action
at the federal level, or in response to the omission of particular protected
19. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 122.
21. Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 393 (2d Cir. 1994).
22. Id. (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
23. Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1996).
24. See, e.g., Simms v. Chaisson, 38 Conn. L. Rptr. 211, 212 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004) (declining to
apply Farrar to the Connecticut statute outlawing racially motivated harassment because the statute
"does not appear to be linked to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in any way"); Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 929-31
(N.J. 2004) (using Farrar to support the awarding of attorney's fees to a plaintiff in a sexual harassment
suit under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination); Keith v. Howerton, No. E2003-02210-COA-
R3CV, 2004 WL 2412615, at *3-*5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2004) (applying Farrar analysis to the
Tennessee Consumer Protection Act).
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classes in federal laws.25 Yet because most of them are patterned after corollary
federal statutes, courts are inclined to interpret the local and state laws in pari
materia with their federal counterparts.26 The question of whether to adopt the
Farrar standard for those laws therefore presses on some of the most difficult
issues of statutory interpretation and federal-state relations.
II. THE MCGRATH LITIGATION
In December 2000, Donna McGrath, Tanya Medina, and Tara Lopez-all
preoperative transsexuals-were harassed while shopping in a Brooklyn Toys
"R" Us. 27 They filed a claim with the New York City Commission on Human
Rights, and Toys "R" Us offered them 100 "Geoffrey Dollars"--coupons for
28use in the store-to settle the case. McGrath and her friends filed a diversity
suit in federal district court under NYCHRL, contending that Toys "R" Us's
employees had violated the statute by discriminating against the three women
in public accommodation. 29 The jury found for the three plaintiffs, but awarded
them only nominal damages-one dollar each.3°
McGrath petitioned for the award of attorney's fees and was awarded
nearly $200,000 for her lawyers by the District Court.31 In making this award,
the court adopted the Supreme Court's reasoning in Farrar that "the most
important factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee is the degree of
success obtained., 32 However, it also noted that there is "no rule that an award
of nominal damages will never support a fee award., 33 Indeed, it noted that
"[t]his case is one of those unusual and infrequent instances in which attorneys
fees should be awarded., 34
Toys "R" Us appealed the award to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, contending that the fee award was unreasonable "given that
the jury awarded each plaintiff only $1 in nominal damages." 35 Because the
Second Circuit was sitting in diversity and there were "ambiguities in New
York law regarding the standards applicable to determining a reasonable fee
25. See, e.g., Stephen Clark, Progressive Federalism? A Gay Liberationist Perspective, 66 ALB. L.
REV. 719, 720-21 (2003) (discussing the proliferation of local ordinances prohibiting discrimination
against people on the basis of sexual orientation).
26. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
27. See McGrath v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., No. CV-01-3071 (CPS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22610, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2002).
28. Valerie Jablow, Prevailing New York Civil Rights Plaintiffs Get Fees-With a Caveat, TRIAL,
Feb. 2005, at 83.
29. See Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107(4).
30. Jablow, supra note 28, at 83.
31. McGrath, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22610, at *1.
32. Id. at *4.
33. Id. at *5-*6.
34. Id. at *6.
35. McGrath v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 356 F.3d 246, 247 (2d Cir. 2004).
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award' 36 under the attorney's fee provision of NYCHRL in a case of nominal
damages, it certified a series of questions to the New York State Court of
Appeals,37 namely the procedures for awarding attorneys' fees in "partial
victory" cases. The federal Court of Appeals asked the state Court of Appeals
(1) whether New York applies the Farrar standard to NYCHRL; (2) whether, if
the Farrar standard applies, the attorney's fee provision authorizes a fee award
to a prevailing plaintiff "who receives only nominal damages but whose lawsuit
served a significant public purpose"; and (3) whether the particular outcome in
the McGrath case-"the first. . . favorable jury verdict on a claim of unlawful
discrimination against transsexuals in public accommodation... even though
the law's prohibition of discrimination against transsexuals in employment...
has previously been recognized"-constituted such a significant public
purpose.38 The Court of Appeals answered all three questions in the
affirmative.
In answering the first and second questions, determining the applicability of
Farrar to the New York City Human Rights Law, the state court noted that
"[w]here our state and local civil rights statutes are substantively and textually
similar to their federal counterparts, our Court has generally interpreted them
consistently with federal precedent."'39 Noting that "the City Counsel [sic]
adopted a fee provision that appears to have been modeled after the federal
statutes interpreted in Farrar," 4° the court concluded that the Farrar standard is
applicable to attorney's fee claims under NYCHRL.
This analysis flies in the face of the Law's legislative history, which
provides significant evidence that the City Council intended the Human Rights
Law to be construed broadly. As the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New
York noted in its amicus brief to the state Court of Appeals,
A principal goal of both the City Council and the Mayor in enacting the 1991
amendments [to the City Human Rights Law] was to steer a course more protective
of civil rights than was being followed on either the state or federal level, an
intention manifest from the legislative history of the 1991 amendments: "[T]he
'legislative history' of the NYCHRL makes clear that it is to be even more liberally
construed than the federal and state anti-discrimination laws."
4 1
36. Id. at 247-48.
37. Pursuant to the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity must apply relevant underlying
state law. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Second Circuit's local rules permit the
court to "certify to the highest court of a state an unsettled and significant question of state law that will
control the outcome of a case pending before this Court." 2D CIR. R. 0.27. The New York Court of
Appeals permits such certification from federal courts and courts of last resort. N.Y. CT. APP. R.
500.17(a).
38. McGrath, 356 F.3d at 254. The Court of Appeals certified a fourth question as well, which
quickly became moot: "If the Farrar standard does not apply, what standard should a court use to
determine what constitutes a reasonable fee award for a prevailing party who has received only nominal
damages?" Id.
39. McGrath v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 821 N.E.2d 519, 522 (N.Y. 2004).
40. Id. at 526.
41. Brief and Legislative Materials Appendix of Amici Curiae Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro
Yale Law & Policy Review
As amici suggested, a reading of the Law consistent with the City Council's
intent demanded a rejection of the narrow Farrar standard, because such a
reading would unduly limit the availability of attorney's fees and thereby
hamper efforts to enforce the Law in court. The court rejected amici's broad
reading of the legislative history, noting only that the legislative history
included "many general statements ... indicating that the private right of action
provision, adopted to keep the City at the forefront of human rights protection,
should be liberally construed. ' 42 With respect to attorney's fee provisions, "no
distinct standard... is described, nor is there any criticism of the federal
approach to such awards. ' 43 Rejecting a broad general intent expressed by the
legislature in favor of a canon of statutory interpretation that favors narrow
reading in the absence of clear, specific legislative intent, the Court of Appeals
rejected amici's argument that the Farrar standard was antithetical to the aims
of the City Council and the Human Rights Law.
But this reasoning is arguably anachronistic. Plaintiffs and amici argued
that, because the Law was amended in 1991 and Farrar decided in 1992, the
City Council could not have intended to apply the Farrar standard. Rather, it
would have applied the prevailing federal law at the time, the Second Circuit's
decision in Ruggiero v. Krzeminski.44 In Ruggiero, the Second Circuit affirmed
its liberal standard for determining the availability of attorney's fees, holding
that a jury verdict in plaintiffs' favor was sufficient to "'change[] the legal
relationship' between the Ruggieros and the Officers in that a violation of
rights had been found,' 45 thus qualifying plaintiffs for a fee award regardless of
whether damages awarded were nominal or substantial. Had the City Council
sought to import any federal legal standard as its model for interpretation of the
Human Rights Law, it would have been Ruggiero's, as amici noted:
The idea that, at the same time that the New York City Council was expanding its
Human Rights Law in numerous profound respects, it would have been
contemplating as a model the more restrictive Fifth Circuit view (the Circuit from
which Farrar arose) over a less restrictive Second Circuit view is, to put it mildly,
highly implausible. 
6
The state Court of Appeals dispatched with this argument by noting that the
"City Council has not hesitated in other circumstances to amend the New York
City Human Rights Law to clarify its disagreement with evolving Supreme
Court precedent. ''47 Given that twelve years separated Farrar and McGrath, the
New York, Inc. et al. at 5, McGrath, 821 N.E. 519 (N.Y. 2004) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy
Review) (quoting Burger v. Litton Indus., Inc., 69 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 44,426 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), report
adopted 69 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 44,427 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
42. McGrath, 821 N.E.2d at 524.
43. Id. at 525.
44. 928 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1991).
45. Id. at 564.
46. Brief of Amici at 10, McGrath, 821 N.E.2d 519.
47. McGrath, 821 N.E.2d at 525.
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City Council had ample time to repudiate the Farrar standard and adopt its
own, or command reliance on another case, like Ruggiero.
This last point seems to have been determinative in the court's decision to
adopt the Farrar standard. Most evidence suggests that the New York City
Council sought to differentiate its human rights statute from federal civil rights
law, sweeping more classes within its ambit and strengthening the rights of
action and remedies. Yet the state Court of Appeals regarded itself as bound by
traditional canons of statutory interpretation to import federal standards to
structurally analogous statutes, for the sake of consistency and administrative
clarity."
In responding to the Second Circuit's third certified question, the Court of
Appeals tempered the ostensibly bright-line rule they established by approving
the Farrar standard. Having endorsed a strict reading of the Human Rights
Law as a matter of statutory interpretation, the state Court of Appeals then took
a split-the-difference approach in its interpretation of the "significant public
purpose" exception, adopting a "groundbreaking, ' 49 liberal conception of the
doctrine. At the time of the McGrath trial, the applicability of the Human
Rights Law to transsexuals was uncertain, yet there was strong evidence that
the Law protected members of that class. Because some lower courts had
determined that NYCHRL protected transsexuals from employment
discrimination, 50 and the Law had since been amended explicitly to include
transsexuality within the range of classes protected by the statute, 51 the
defendants argued that "this litigation was not significant."
52
But the Court brushed these facts aside in favor of a broad reading of the
public purpose exception. The Court sided with the plaintiffs on this matter,
noting that "[a]s was apparent to the City Council, the fact that a handful of
lower courts had interpreted the statute broadly did not put to rest the scope of
48. The canon of in pari materia counsels courts to interpret consistently those statutes that use
similar language or are modeled on other statutes. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 1039-53 (3d ed. 2001). The Court of Appeals specifically adverts to this
rule when it states, "[w]here our state and local civil rights statutes are substantively and textually
similar to their federal counterparts, our Court has generally interpreted them consistently with federal
precedent." McGrath, 821 N.E.2d at 522.
49. John Caher, Court Adopts Standard for Fees in Rights Cases, N.Y.L.J, Nov. 24, 2004, at 1.
50. See McGrath, 821 N.E.2d at 519.
51. The Code, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender, now provides: "The term
gender' shall include actual or perceived sex and shall also include a person's gender identity, self-
image, appearance, behavior or expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance,
behavior or expression is different from that traditionally associated with the legal sex assigned to that
person at birth." NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE ch. 1, tit. 8, § 8-102(23) (2002).
52. McGrath, 821 N.E.2d at 519. Two dissenting judges on the Court of Appeals agreed with
defendants on this point. While he approved the application of the Farrar standard to the NYCHRL,
dissenting Judge Read noted, "plaintiffs failed to accomplish any important public goal as private
attorneys general by litigating a civil rights issue that had already been resolved in favor of transsexuals
by the courts." Id. at 529-30 (Read, J., dissenting in part).
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coverage issue." 53 Ascribing great importance to the expressive function of jury
verdicts and the public education function central to civil rights statutes, the
court adopted a commodious understanding of "significant public purpose":
In this case, the District Court reasoned that the verdict was significant and
performed a public purpose because it involved a series of "firsts"---e.g., it was the
first public accommodation case that went to verdict under the New York City
Human Rights Law, and was the first judgment in favor of transsexuals. We cannot
conclude that a judgment in favor of a historically unrecognized group can never
serve an important public purpose; a groundbreaking verdict can educate the public
concerning substantive rights and increase awareness as to the plight of a
disadvantaged class. Particularly in the civil rights arena, a jury verdict can
communicate community condemnation of unlawful discrimination. It is therefore
reasonable for a court to consider whether the verdict served this function in
determining the significance of the relief obtained, although this is neither the only
factor that may be considered nor will it necessarily be determinative.
54
This understanding of "significant public purpose" affords courts almost
limitless ability to apply Justice O'Connor's Farrar exception to civil rights
cases. If the judgment in any way sensitizes the public to the "plight of a
disadvantaged class," it has served a public purpose. Indeed because, prior to
the jury's verdict in McGrath, "many city residents might have been
unaware... that discrimination against transsexuals was prohibited,, 55 the case
served a significant public purpose. Similar arguments can be marshaled for a
large set of civil rights violations.
What, then, is the upshot of the New York Court of Appeals' decision to
adopt both the conservative Farrar standard and a capacious understanding of
its traditionally narrow public purpose exception? The logic lies in the court's
understanding of the educational and behavior modification functions played
by civil rights statutes. Paradoxically, the Farrar standard might afford courts
the opportunity to advance civil rights litigation even farther than more liberal
standards for the award of attorney's fees. Under the Ruggiero standard, for
example, a jury verdict is prima facie evidence of a party having prevailed in
litigation. There is no opportunity for a court to note explicitly the significant
public purpose served by the litigation, or to articulate its understanding of the
meaning of the jury verdict or other outcome. Under the Farrar standard,
particularly as it is embraced by the New York Court of Appeals, courts are
afforded a unique opportunity to underscore the political importance of certain
court judgments and, in doing so, consecrate the cases as having particular
educative or expressive implications.
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CONCLUSION
Amidst attacks on the capacity of civil rights attorneys to bring lawsuits and
the federal retrenchment of civil rights laws, states and localities are jealously
(and appropriately) guarding their right to guarantee expansive protection to
minorities. 56 While attorney's fees are only one small component of the full
array of antidiscrimination tools available to advocates and activists, they play
an important strategic and symbolic role in guaranteeing the rights of
disadvantaged groups.
McGrath is significant not simply because it substantially alters the terrain
of civil rights litigation in New York, but also because it portends the coming
of a great battle in civil rights litigation more broadly. As cities and states
attempt to stanch the tide of the federal retreat from civil rights protections by
passing their own statutes, they must be attentive not only to the substance of
the statutes, but also to how they are likely to be interpreted by courts. McGrath
counsels careful attention on the part of legislators to the prevailing modes of
statutory interpretation in a given jurisdiction and to the manifold ways in
which legislation can provide its own interpretive guidelines.
56. See Richard Thompson Ford, The New Blue Federalists, SLATE, Jan. 6, 2005, at
http://slate.com/id/2111942.

